Answers to questions from Ming Pao
- As the US Consul General during the HK handover, how do you view HK after 25 years? Is it still the city you know or expect to be?
Unfortunately, Hong Kong no longer shines as it once did. For a long time after the handover –20 years at least– Hong Kong thrived on its unique vitality, an openness to people and ideas, a commitment to efficiency over politics and a thriving youth culture that inspired others in China and around the world. However, starting in 2013 and accelerating in recent years, Hong Kong leaders began kowtowing to all manner of orders from Beijing. The new leaders in Beijing couldn’t abide the tumult, the demonstrations, the energy and the creative destruction that had always characterized Hong Kong. At the time of the Handover, one of Hong Kong’s local leaders told me “No one ever made money betting against Hong Kong.” I’m afraid that’s no longer true. It hasn’t been true for several years now. Hong Kong’s success has always grown out of its energetic spirit and openness, as those fade, so too does Hong Kong’s attractiveness to outside professionals, investors and business people (including mainlanders, many of whom have prospered there). Thus, at its 25th anniversary as an autonomous area, Hong Kong is a once-great city now in decline.
- How do you evaluate the role of HK in US-China relations (including political, commerce, trade, intelligence, etc.)? How do such roles make HK enjoy special status during a relatively positive status of US-China relations, while also making HK deeply drawn into the storm when US and China turned into strategic competition?
At the time of the Handover, based on the Hong Kong Policy Act, the U.S. Consulate General and the State Department argued strenuously throughout the US government to ensure that no rules or regulations were applied automatically to Hong Kong as they applied to China. It was a long and difficult bureaucratic struggle but one based on the idea that Hong Kong enjoyed a “high degree of autonomy” under the Basic Law and that Hong Kong could control its own borders and internal affairs. Unfortunately more recently it has become increasingly clear that Beijing has taken away these devolved powers from the Hong Kong government. Hong Kong’s new leaders appear more interested in pleasing leaders in Beijing than in safeguarding Hong Kong’s prosperity, autonomy, integrity and identity. As Hong Kong’s autonomy has been shrinking, US policy has turned to treat Hong Kong more and more like the mainland, taking away opportunities for people, business, technology cooperation and travelers from Hong Kong.
- With the sanctions risks from Washington and the hardline approach from Beijing, as well as the ongoing disengagement (if not [selective] decoupling) of US-China relations, do you think HK may still avoid a dim future under such a negative geopolitical climate?
Hong Kong’s future is indeed dim, but not because of geopolitics. Internal developments within Hong Kong mean it is no longer the mecca it once was for investors, for information, for overseas business and for legally-protected finance and other activities. Imposition of new practices based on unpredictable dictates from Beijing has made it an unsafe place to live and do business for local people and expats alike. If Hong Kong maintained its independent legal character and standards, then geopolitical strains would add to its value as a haven and meeting place for business despite tensions.
- Yet some observers like Richard Bush may point out that, several years before the 2019 protests, there are already several turning points in US-HK relations, i.e. the Edward Snowden case (2013) and the Umbrella movement (2014). How did the two events change the US perception of HK (esp. on its extent of autonomy)? How did they accumulate political momentum for the final passage of “HK Human Rights and Democracy Acts” (and other HK-related acts later) after the 2019 protests?
The Snowden case put Hong Kong in a precarious position, stuck between US demands and a desire to follow Hong Kong law. Without knowing the details, I know that many were relieved when Snowden decided to travel on to Moscow. I’d like to think Snowden left because he didn’t want to face justice and extradition in Hong Kong courts, but the Hong Kong government wavered and didn’t act swiftly to place him in custody.
- In 2020, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified to the US congress that HK no longer enjoyed (high) autonomy from Beijing and thus no longer warranted the preferential treatments from Washington. It seems that the Biden administration inherited such judgment. What has happened to HK till now according to such certification? Do you expect the development will be even more consequential in the foreseeable future?
The result of this judgment –which hasn’t been changed– is to limit the sale of dual-use high technology –that is computers, scopes, machine tools, measuring equipment, etc that have both civilian and military uses. For example, if the US were to sell night vision equipment to the Hong Kong police or precision machining tools to a Hong Kong manufacturer, how would we know that the equipment wouldn’t make its way across the border to China for military use? Prior to 2020, that assumption was made because of Hong Kong’s internal and border controls. By 2020, it was clear that Hong Kong authorities would bend those rules whenever asked by Beijing. Other situations like this may easily arise, with rules of origin for example, and thus unless Hong Kong’s autonomy under the basic law is respected, it is hard to imagine anything but further tightening in the future.
- Though HK was already expected to be a “promising” Asian spy hub right before the handover (e.g. the IHT article by Gerald Segal), Beijing tended to keep a lower profile on the remaining influence from the West. After the outbreak of the Umbrella movement, Beijing started to accuse the West (esp. US) of “colour revolution” and such accusations even rose to peak after the 2019 protests. How will you respond to Beijing’s accusations of “interference”? With some US commentaries comparing the situation of HK to that of Taiwan, will Beijing be even more nervous and suspicious about US intentions?
The United States has always promoted democracy and openness in Hong Kong. Even during colonial days we pressed the British to move more quickly on direct voting and representation in Legco. Since the Handover, the US has based its policy on the promises of the Basic Law to respect the integrity of Hong Kong’s government, to move to universal suffrage and to allow Hong Kong to control its borders and trade. Many protesters are asking for the same thing; implementation of the Basic Law. The US has always had active people-to-people relations with Hong Kong and continues these contacts. This is not “color revolution” merely standing up for China to implement its international promises, as endorsed by the United Nations.
With regard to Taiwan, China’s actions in Hong Kong carry a terrible lesson. How could anyone on Taiwan find reunification attractive when China violates its law, its promises and its interests in Hong Kong, as well as the rights and livelihood of people there. Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong serve to push the people on Taiwan farther away from any thoughts of reunificaiton.
richardboucher 